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Abstract   
 
Workplace safety continues to be an area of concern in the maritime industry due to the international nature 
of the operations. The effectiveness of extensive legislation to manage shipboard safety remains in doubt. 
The focus must therefore shift towards the human element - seafarers and their perceptions of safety. The 
study aims to understand the alignment that exists between safety culture and safety climate on board ships 
as perceived by seafarers. The underlying factors of safety climate were identified using factor analysis 
which isolated seven factors - Support on Safety, Organizational Support, Resource Availability, Work 
Environment, Job Demands, 'Just' Culture, and Safety Compliance. The perception of safety level of 
seafarers was found to be low indicating the existence of misalignments between safety culture values and 
the actual safety climate. The study also reveals that the safety perceptions of officers employed directly 
by ship owners and those by managers do not differ significantly, nor do they differ between senior and 
junior officers. A shift in perspective towards how seafarers themselves feel towards safety might provide 
more effective solutions – instead of relying on regulations - and indeed aid in reducing incidents on board. 
This paper details practical suggestions on how to identify the factors that contribute towards a better safety 
climate on board ships. 
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I. Introduction 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that worldwide around 340 million 
occupational accidents and 160 million work related illnesses occur annually. Approximately 2.3 
million individuals lose their lives due to work-related accidents or diseases every year which is an 
astounding 6000 deaths every single day, and costs the global economy a staggering $1.25 trillion 
or 4% of the world’s GDP annually (ILO, 2012). American businesses incurred annual losses to the 
tune of USD 170 billion (Leigh, 2011), while in the UK, in 2011/12, workplace illnesses cost an 
estimated £13.8 billion, (HSE, 2013), and in Australia $60.6 billion in the 2008–09 financial year 
(Safe Work Australia, 2013). 
Shipping is one of the most dangerous industries in the world; between 2003–12, the fatal 
accident rate in shipping was 21 times that of the general British workforce, 4.7 times of that in the 
construction industry and 13 times of that in manufacturing (Roberts et al, 2014). Kristiansen (2005) 
found that shipping has a fatality frequency of 1.9 – 2.1 per thousand, against 0.15 for industry, 0.3 
for construction and 0.9 – 1.4 for mining. 
Ship operators, through the P&I industry, are estimated to deal with third party liability claims 
for personal injury, illness and death totaling more than $400 million a year (UK P&I, 2013). The 
Club finds that despite the number of personal injury and illness claims stabilizing, the per capita 
cost of the individual claims has risen by over 300% in recent years, and individual injury and 
illness claims now cost more than cargo claims. Between 2005 and 2010 the average cost of 
Members’ claims was about $12,000 per claim. For the Swedish Club (2013), the claim costs for 
illness and injury made up 8% of all claims between 2009 and 2013, as opposed to 10% for pollution 
claims, while Skuld (2013) reported that injury claims were second highest after those related to 
cargo. Data provided by a major P&I Club revealed that in the period between February 2007 to 
November 2011, there were 3,580 injury claims, resulting in costs of USD 111,622,000. NEPIA 
(2012) reported that over the past 5 years, crew illness and injury claims accounted for 20% of all 
of claims, UK Club (2014) reported net notified claims of approximately $50 million in the year 
2013, while American Club (2012) reported average cost of injury claims to be at around $28,000 
per case. For P&I clubs, the big concern continued to be the “human element”, and human error 
remained the major factor in many claims. 
The primary objective of the study was to understand the alignment between safety culture and 
climate on board ships, and to assess the extent to which the safety climate matches with the 
espoused values on safety. Safety climate is the construct used to take a ‘snap shot’ of the safety 
culture on board ships. By its very nature, safety culture is multidimensional, and factor analysis is 
the most widely used technique for its analysis (Havold, 2007). Exploratory factor analysis was 
used to identify and explain the underlying factors, while an analysis of the responses would provide 
information on the alignment of safety climate and safety culture. Secondary objectives were to 
determine if the safety perceptions were different between officers working for ship managers’ and 
ship owners, as well as between senior and junior officers. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Safety Culture and Safety Climate 
The traditional approach to addressing workplace safety was through statutory means or via physical 
barriers and similar preventative measures that did not call for any additional care on the part of the 
individual (Cooper, 2001). Accidents however continued to rise at alarming rates (Cooper, 2001; Reason, 
1997), shifting the focus to human factors and the possibility of reducing accidents by providing employees 
with relevant knowledge and skills. Although research did show that managerial and organizational factors 
had clear roles in contributing to safety incidents, most practitioners chose to focus almost exclusively on 
the unsafe acts of workers, building on a prevalent view that certain people were “accident prone” 
(Heinrich, 1931).  
The term “safety culture” was first introduced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
after their inquiry into the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in 1986, which concluded that non-
compliance with operating procedures significantly  contributed to the disaster, indicating a poor culture 
of safety at the plant (Lee, 1998). The lack of an effective safety culture was also found to have contributed 
to other major disasters such as the Piper- Alpha oil platform explosion in the North Sea, sinking of the 
Herald of Free Enterprise ferry etc. 
The ACSNI Study Group (1993) defines safety culture as: “... the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style 
and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety programmes. Organizations with a positive safety 
culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventative measures.” 
Safety culture incorporates all the traditional methods of improving safety and goes beyond it by 
focusing on the presence of good quality safety management systems (Cooper, 2001); it encompasses the 
norms, values, and basic assumptions of an entire organization, and refers to the extent to which individuals 
and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate 
safety concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both individual and organizational) behaviour 
based on lessons learned from mistakes, and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values 
(Wiegmann et al, 2002). Safety culture is thus a broad term that represents all aspects of an organization’s 
values and actions related to safety. 
Existing at another level and interchangeably used with safety culture is safety climate, coined 
by Zohar (1980), who defines it as “a summary of molar perceptions that employees share about 
their work environments”. Others support this view with Niskanen (1994) defining it as “a set of 
attributes that can be perceived about particular work organizations and which may be induced by 
the policies and practices that organizations impose upon their workers”; Cabrera et al (1997) 
conceptualize safety climate as organizational members’ “shared perceptions about their work 
environments and organizational safety policies”. 
Current safety literature finds the concept of safety climate to be the accumulation of beliefs, values, 
and perceptions about safety that are shared within a specific group (Zohar, 1980; Cooper and Philips, 
2004; Guldenmund, 2000), at any given time as manifested by recent or current events. The HSE Report 
(2005) states that the term safety climate should be used to refer to psychological characteristics of 
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employees (i.e. “how people feel” as opposed to “what people do”), corresponding to the values, attitudes, 
and perceptions of employees with regard to safety within an organization. Weigman et al (2002) argue 
that safety climate is a psychological phenomenon, which is usually defined as the perceptions of the state 
of safety at a particular time. Safety climate is closely aligned with intangible issues such as situational and 
environmental factors, and it is a temporal phenomenon, a “snapshot” of safety culture, relatively unstable 
and subject to change. 
Opinion is split on whether safety culture and safety climate are the same construct. Cooper 
(2000) argues that even though these two terms are similar in concept and inextricably linked, they 
are distinctly separate entities. In his review, Guldenmund (2000) listed eighteen definitions of 
safety culture and safety climate, stating that some authors perceived safety climate and culture as 
the same phenomenon, while many perceive the two as separate constructs - safety climate being 
the manifestation of safety culture. Some feel that safety climate can be considered to be effectively 
the same as safety culture (Davies et al, 2001). 
Safety culture is derived from a historical context or organizational operations, values, and traditions, 
and is generally created over a long period of time. The safety culture is the underlying belief that creates 
a climate. Safety culture is seen as a sub-facet of organizational culture (Cooper, 2000; Weigmann et al, 
2002) and exists at a higher level of abstraction than safety climate (Reichers and Schneider, 1990). Safety 
climate has a narrower focus than safety culture and exists closer to operations, being characterized by day-
to-day perceptions towards the working environment, working practices, organizational policies, and 
management. Thus, safety culture and safety climate appear to operate on different levels. However, due 
to the inherent stability of safety culture, it is considered to be an antecedent of individual behaviour. 
Employees may often be driven to action, or inaction, based on their perceptions of reality driven by the 
safety climate. However, once these changes in perception are removed, the norms of the existing safety 
culture will be back in place. 
 
2.2 Drivers of safety culture 
Safety culture is a subset of the wider organizational culture, and to develop safety culture it must be 
recognized that safety culture is about people, their organization and interactions (IAEA, 1986). The 
organizational culture influences human behaviour and human performance at work and can be equally 
influential on safety outcomes as safety management systems themselves (Cardinus, n.d.). Thus aspects 
that need to be taken into consideration include the behaviours, perceptions and attitudes of the people 
involved, the structure of the organization, internal communications, decision making processes, 
management styles and the like, as these directly affect attitudes, behaviour and the motivations of those 
who have to do the work. 
National culture should also be taken into account when trying to understand safety culture as it is 
likely to influence the organizational culture itself (IAEA, 1986; Hofstede 1991). Differences between 
nationalities play an important role, as the value of life, safety standards, and risk perception are known to 
differ between them (Oltedal, 2011; Havold, 2007, IAEA, 1986). Lardner (2003) finds that although there 
is some evidence to suggest that safety culture varies significantly due to differences in national cultures, 
the evidence is limited. He concludes that “the influence of national or regional culture does not preclude 
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establishing a local site safety culture which differs markedly from other similar local sites. A strong safety 
culture can override national or regional culture, if this safety culture is actively and consistently promoted”. 
Guldenmund (2000) views safety culture having three levels, like the layers of an onion. “Basic 
assumptions” – not safety specific but general - form the core, and refers to those assumptions that are 
implicit, taken for granted, unconscious and shared throughout the organization. The attitudes of the 
organizations members - “espoused values” - is the second layer, and are more specific to safety, instead 
of organizational factors. These are attitudes towards management systems (e.g. safety systems), hardware 
(e.g. plant design), people (e.g. senior management) and behaviour (e.g. risk taking). The third or outermost 
layer consists of “artefacts” or the outward expression of the safety culture, such as equipment (e.g. 
personal protective equipment), behaviours, (e.g. using appropriate safety equipment or managers 
conducting safety tours), physical signs (e.g. posting number of days since last accident publicly) and safety 
performance (number of incidents). 
 
2.3 Development of Safety in the Maritime Industry 
Since the formation of the IMO, a combination of regulations, advancements in technology and 
standardized training have been used to enhance maritime safety. A number of very serious accidents 
occurring in the 80’s were shown to be a result of human errors, with management faults also identified as 
contributing factors. Thus the need was felt for a safety management system, leading to the development 
and implementation of the International Safety Management Code (ISM) in 1998. 
Although the ISM Code is considered to provide a good basis for safety management, the extent of its 
implementation is a widely held concern with ISM audits and statutory surveys widely perceived to be of 
very limited benefit in helping to drive forward positive changes in safety management and leadership 
(MCA, 2004). Lappalainen’s (2008) study also found that the direct effect and influence of the ISM Code 
on maritime safety could not be very well isolated and no quantitative measurement could be found to 
describe the impacts of the ISM Code on maritime safety. 
From a practical perspective, Chen et al (2006) identify three types of culture in shipping companies 
that define their varying levels of commitment, competence, and compliance with safety. The first is an 
Avoidance Culture where companies avoid compliance by trading only in areas where it is known that 
such regulations are not adequately enforced or are overlooked for the right price. Compliance Culture is 
the second, with the majority of operators falling under this category, where a minimalist approach to safety 
compliance is the operative strategy. Companies try to maintain the minimum safety standards required by 
regulation and ensure compliance in the most economical way possible, regardless of any long term costs 
and benefits. The last is Safety Culture which includes a growing number of ship owners who are generally 
market leaders in their trade or region and who have genuinely embraced safety management and believe 
that long term success is dependent on an effective safety culture. 
The compliance culture achieves the goal of better safety management without adding to the ship 
owners’ costs. However, the essence of a good safety culture should be to bring about an alignment 
between the seafarers’ values, goals and relevant safety norms. It is only when this alignment is in place 
that seafarers will feel inspired to implement firm and effective self-regulation and feel encouraged to take 
personal ownership of established best practices. Internationally recognized safety principles and the 
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safeguards of best industry practice have to become an integral part of an individual’s own standards (MCA, 
2010). 
ABS (2012) state that “the goal of the ISM Code, and of Safety Management Systems (SMS’s) is the 
attainment of peak safety performance (i.e., no operational incidents, no personal injuries, and no harm to 
the environment), but the maritime industry is still some way from achieving this goal. These tools 
undoubtedly aid compliance with regulation, but they do not necessarily improve safety culture”. 
Importantly, they also point out that “there is a general recognition in the industry that encouraging safe 
working practices does not require more rules, regulations, and procedures. Instead, the industry needs a 
better understanding of social and organizational factors that foster professionalism in the seafarer in 
routine and emergency situations”. 
It is in this context that the relevance of an effective safety culture becomes the key to improving 
occupational safety on board ships. Commitment from the top management forms the cornerstone of good 
safety management; they must show commitment by setting company policies, providing resources for 
improving safety, investing capital and actively communicating on safety issues (IMO, 2008).  
 
2.4 Challenges Faced in Shipping 
The shipping industry has certain challenges that must be overcome in order to have an effective safety 
culture. The MCA (2004) found that there were great barriers to the development of the safety culture in 
the maritime industry, while Hänninen (2007) opines that there are major defects in its safety culture. 
One of the barriers is the distance between the company offices – where the safety management system 
is developed – and the ships where it is actually implemented. The senior management, who set the tone 
through the existing organizational culture, is not subject to the actual work place. The implementation is 
delegated to the senior staff on board, generally the Master. In some cases there is a perception that there 
is excessive interference from shore staff with limited practical experience, which thereby undermines the 
authority of the Master as leader, creating a feeling of resentment and low morale (MCA, 2004). 
Additionally there is widespread concern that managers ashore do not have at-sea experience, and thus 
lack the knowledge to make key safety decisions which will affect the ship (ibid). 
The second challenge is the contractual nature of employment on ships, with different tenures for 
different ranks. The transient nature of work, high turnover and lack of crew stability are some of the most 
significant barriers to effective safety cultures (Anderson, 2003; Report ISM, 2008; MCA, 2004; Oltedal, 
2011). High turnover of seafarers also has considerable implications on the implementation of the ISM 
Code and the safety of the vessel, something that certain sectors like the cruise ship industry with average 
annual turnover rates between 25% and 35%, are grappling with (ITF, n.d.). 
Multinational crews are the norm and as a result subcultures, conflicts, ambiguity, stress, and 
misunderstandings are possible due to the instability of membership, and also because of a lack of 
shared history of practice (Oltedal, 2011). Nationality differences play an important role, as the 
value of life, safety standards, and risk perceptions are known to differ between nationalities 
(Oltedal, 2011; Havold, 2007). Where organizational and national cultures are in harmony, safety 
is not influenced; disharmony creates stress and influences safety. There is also widespread concern 
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that in addition to the isolation from land, multinational crews experience isolation among different 
cultural and national groups on board (MCA, 2004). 
The use of crew management companies may also impact safety as Shipowners lose control over the 
assessment of qualifications, training, and competence of the crew manning their ships. It is questionable 
as to whether the crew supplied by agents would take the ship owners safety goals and objectives to heart, 
due to the feeling of lack of ownership and short employment contracts (Oltedal, 2011). Outside of the 
difficulties to make a positive impact on the organizational culture, there is also the possibility of dilution 
of safety standards, resulting in senior management not being as committed to safety, had the seafarers also 
been from their own country. This lack of commitment may trickle down to vessels, creating an ineffective 
safety climate on board. 
 
 
III. Research Methodology 
3.1 Analytical Methodology 
SPSS 20 was used for all analysis. For factor analysis, Varimax orthogonal rotation with Kaiser 
normalization was used for extraction, which uses a default eigenvalue of 1 as the cutoff. However, 0.9 
was taken as the eigenvalue cutoff for extraction as Jolliffe (1972) considers Kaiser’s criterion too strict, 
suggesting retaining all factors with an eigenvalue greater than 0.7. Hair et al (2009) also state that the 
eigenvalue criterion with less than 20 variables is not reliable as too few factors are extracted, suggesting 
solutions that explain 60% of the total variance in social sciences. Thus, in order to explain at least 
maximum variance, and retain a suitable number of factors, an eigenvalue of over 0.9 was considered as 
the best criterion. Additionally, in order to ensure higher loadings, coefficients less than 0.5 were excluded. 
This resulted in isolating more factors explaining a larger percentage of variance. 
 
3.2 Questionnaire Design and Survey Respondents 
 For the purposes of this study, Indian officers were selected, India being the third largest supplier of 
manpower to the maritime industry, with more than 42,000 officers (Drewry, 2012). The population 
consisted of licensed and actively sailing Indian Merchant Naval Officers. The survey was carried out at 
two maritime training colleges in New Delhi and the NCR region where officers attend short term STCW 
courses. The questionnaire was personally administered over a period of 3 months to officers during regular 
class room sessions and the responses were collected at the same time, giving a total of 448 completed 
questionnaires. The three month period accounted for student turnover, allowing new candidates to be 
surveyed. Care was taken not to include earlier participants. 433 responses were found to be usable, and 
based on the requirements of Factor Analysis, this sample size was considered to be suitable for analysis. 
Safety data was collected using a questionnaire with items generated using the common elements as 
identified from the literature review. These were reviewed by a panel of five experts spread across 
academia, shipping, and industry, who all commented on the clarity and relevance of the items, and the 
comprehensiveness of the questionnaire in covering all relevant aspects. Based on their recommendations, 
the final questionnaire consisted of 19 items for the measurement of safety, and eight others to compile 
58
BHATTACHARYA / Measuring Safety Culture on Ships Using Safety Climate: A Study among Indian Officers 
demographic data. The Cronbach Alpha was calculated as 0.856, which indicated good internal 
consistency. 
 
Table 1: Reliability Statistics – Retention Variables 
 
A Safety scale was developed assisting in categorizing the safety score into High, Medium and Low. 
Items were weighted from 5 (Strongly Agree) to 1 (Strongly Disagree). Respondents scoring “5” on all 
items would have a total score of 95. Similarly, if the score on all items was “1”, the scores would be 19. 
Respondents were classified into the “High” if they agreed with each of the 19 items. Thus the “High” 
category would have a minimum score of 76. Each respondent achieving a safety score of 76 may not have 
agreed with every single item - they could have disagreed with some and strongly agreed with others. The 
“Medium” is the segment scoring between 76 and pure neutrality, or 57, while the “Low” category consists 
of those scoring less than 57. 
The profile of respondents was as shown below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Survey Respondent Profile 
 
3.3 Assessment Variables 
 In order to improve safety culture, it is necessary to measure it. The measurement of safety culture 
provides tangible indicators of existing status and the impact of planned improvements (Health Foundation, 
2011). IAEA finds that no composite measure of safety culture exists, and considering that safety culture 
is multi-faceted, an exact way of measuring it may never be available. They suggest that a single composite 
measure may not be suitable; identification of a range of indicators that reflect the individual sub-
components of culture may be more practicable. It has been recognized that the culture of an organization 
and staff attitudes can have a tangible impact on safety processes and ultimately outcomes (Murphy, 2006), 
therefore an assessment of the safety culture assumes greater significance. 
Organizations need to consider whether they are interested in assessing safety culture or climate 
(Health Foundation, 2011). Safety culture being much broader, it is considered easier to measure safety 
climate as it focuses on employees current perceptions of safety in relation to management support, safety 
policies and practices, trust and openness, supervision, and risk taking. Safety climate is a descriptive 
measure that reflects workers perceptions of the organizational atmosphere (Gonzalez-Roma et al., 1999), 
Cronbach’s Alpha Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of Items 
0.856 0.862 19 
 
Deck Engine Missing 
Total 
No %age No %age No %age 
All 337 77.8 94 21.7 2 0.5 433 
Senior Officers 69 15.9 33 7.6   102 
Junior Officers 268 61.9 61 14.1   329 
Age (Av - yrs) 27.4  29.3    27.8 
Sea Service (Av - yrs) 4.7  5.8    4.9 
Future Career (Av – yrs) 10.45  10.36    10.4 
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and can be regarded as the surface features of the safety culture discerned from the workforce's attitudes 
and perceptions at a given point in time (Schneider and Gunnarson, 1991; Cox and Flin, 1998; HSE, 1999). 
It provides a snapshot of the state of safety and is an indicator of the underlying safety culture of a work 
group, plant or organization (Flin et al, 2000; Weigman, 2002; Guldenmund, 2000). Cox and Flin’s (1998) 
review found that as far as operationalizing the concept into a practical measurement tool, safety climate 
was the preferred term. 
Recent years have seen many safety culture/climate tools developed through cross industry 
collaborations and these have been applied in real working environments (Davies et al, 2001). Many tools 
are available for the assessment of safety climate, and all of these focus on safety climate rather than safety 
culture. Some of the more accepted tools are the Health and Safety Climate Survey Tool (HSCST) 
developed by the HSE in December 1997, the Aberdeen University Offshore Safety Climate Questionnaire, 
the Loughborough University Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit (LSCAT), and the Safety Climate 
Questionnaire developed by Quest Evaluations and Databases Ltd (QSCQ). The use of these tools is 
considered to be an effective method of involving, encouraging and maintaining workers interest in safety 
in the workplace, as, when their views are solicited it leads to greater involvement in safety practices. 
The assessment of safety climate is carried out using a questionnaire survey among employees to 
measure their perceptions of safety, as their perceptions are central to measuring safety climate 
(Wadsworth & Smith, 2009; Cardinus, n.d.). Although there are many models and scales for assessing 
safety climate, there is no universally accepted set of component dimensions or factors (ibid). Havold (2007) 
reports that in the US most of these tools are focused on the healthcare sector, the offshore oil industry in 
the UK, and the aviation industry in Australia. There seems to be no specific tool for measurement in the 
shipping industry. There has been limited research on safety climate in shipping, especially with regard to 
its measurement. Shea (2005) investigated the impact of organizational culture on leadership on board and 
accidents, finding that positive behaviour had a positive impact on the safety climate and vice versa, 
indicating a link between accidents and organizational culture. Lamvik (2002) found that national culture 
played an important part in safety, while Soma (2005) concluded that safety culture depended on the quality 
of the ship owner rather than the ships. 
To understand the drivers of safety culture, a comparative analysis of the elements that are considered 
to determine the maturity of safety cultures of organizations was undertaken (IMO, 2003; Davies et al, 
2001; IAEA, 1986; ABS, 2012). The most common elements found were: 
1. Management commitment and visibility 
2. Communication on matters of safety 
3. Productivity versus safety 
4. Focus on learning from problems rather than allocating blame; 
5. Safety resources 
6. Participation and involvement in safety matters 
7. Shared perceptions about safety 
8. Visible mutual trust between stakeholders 
9. Industrial relations and job satisfaction 
10. Training 
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11. Empowerment of seafarers 
12. Responsiveness of seafarers to comfortably rise to routine job demands 
These elements were used to develop the questionnaire to be used to measure safety climate. 
 
 
IV. Results or Main Findings 
4.1 Safety Scores 
The safety scores of all respondents were calculated using the methodology specified earlier, and the 
distribution was within acceptable limits of normality. The safety scores ranged from 40 to 89, the mean 
calculated as 65.85, with a standard deviation of 8.741, and standard error of 0.420. Categorizing the scores 
gave 13.4% (n=58) in the High category, 72.3% (n=313) in the Medium category and 14.3% (n=62) in the 
Low category.  
 
4.2 Identifying Drivers of Safety 
Correlations between variables were within acceptable limits, and communalities were higher than 0.5, 
with 0.648 the average. Sampling adequacy, as measured by KMO and Bartlett's Test gave a test statistic 
of 0.896. Factor analysis isolated seven factors accounting for 64.810 % of the variability, as shown in 
Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Rotated Component Matrix – Safety Variables
 
 
These factors can be described as follows: 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Safety Training 0.724       
Participation in safety 0.723       
Safety compliance 0.705       
Adherence to SMS 0.681       
Caring shipboard management 0.506       
Feedback and guidance  0.788      
Valued by company  0.636      
Training  0.622      
Caring company  0.533      
Work resources   0.761     
Safety resources   0.691     
Compromise on quality   0.507     
Near miss reporting    0.715    
Job support    0.685    
Safety conscious crew    0.596    
Workload     0.895   
Adequate rest     0.527   
No blame culture      0.863  
Sacrificing safety       0.902 
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Factor 1:   Support on Safety - Safety training, Participation in safety, Safety compliance, 
Adherence to SMS, Caring shipboard management 
Factor 2:   Organizational Support - Feedback & guidance, Valued by company, Training, 
Caring Company  
Factor 3:   Resource Availability - Work resources, Safety resources, Quality of resources  
Factor 4:   Work Environment - Near miss reporting, Job support, Safety conscious crew 
Factor 5:   Job Demands - Work load, Adequate rest 
Factor 6:   “Just” Culture - No blame culture 
Factor 7:   Safety Compliance - Sacrificing safety 
 
4.3 Safety and Type of Employer 
In order to determine if the safety climate varied with the type of employer – ship owner or ship 
manager, and if the two groups of officers were statistically different the independent t-test was 
used (Hinton 2004). The summary of the safety scores of both groups are shown below: 
 
Table 4: Summary of Safety Scores 
Category Owner Employed %age Manager Employed %age 
High 26 13.6 32 13.40 
Medium 164 85.9 203 85.00 
Low 1 0.5 3 1.30 
Total 191 100 238 100.00 
 
Table 5: Group Statistics 
 Type of Company N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Seafarer 
Safety Score 
Ownership 191 66.52 8.887 0.643 
Management 238 65.39 8.653 0.561 
 
The descriptive statistics above do not indicate any significant difference between the two 
groups. The standard deviations also indicate that the spread of scores for both groups are similar. 
To ascertain if the difference in mean safety levels is significant, the Independent Samples Test was 
used and the results are shown in Table 6 below. 
Levene’s test is found to be insignificant as p = 0.840, indicating the variances are 
approximately equal and the Equal variances assumed column is used (Field, 2009). The 
independent t-test results calculate the t-statistic as 1.330, and the significance or two tailed value 
of p is 0.184 (> 0.05). Since the p-value is greater than alpha, it can be concluded that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the two samples - officers employed by ship owners and 
by ship managers have similar safety levels. 
 
 
Table 6: Independent samples Test 
62
BHATTACHARYA / Measuring Safety Culture on Ships Using Safety Climate: A Study among Indian Officers 
  
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Seafarer 
Safety 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.041 0.840 1.330 427 0.184 1.132 0.851 -0.541 2.804 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  1.326 402.378 0.185 1.132 0.853 -0.546 2.809 
 
4.4 Safety and Rank. 
The independent t-test was used to determine if safety scores varied with rank – senior and 
junior officers. The summary of the safety scores and group statistics is shown below: 
 
Table 7: Summary of Safety Scores – Senior vs. Junior Officers 
Category Senior Officers %age Junior Officers %age 
High 13 12.7 44 13.40 
Medium 76 74.6 236 71.70 
Low 13 12.7 49 14.90 
Total 191 100 238 100.00 
 
Table 8: Group Statistics 
 Type of Company N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Seafarer 
Safety Score 
Senior 102 66.25 8.263 0.898 
Junior 329 65.75 8.909 0.491 
 
Here too the descriptive statistics do not indicate any significant difference between the two 
groups. The standard deviations indicate that the spread of scores for both groups are similar. 
 
Table 9: Independent samples Test 
  
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Seafarer 
Safety 
Score 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.026 0.312 0.508 429 0.612 0.504 0.993 -1.447 2.456 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  0.528 179.745 0.598 0.504 0.954 -1.379 2.387 
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Levene’s test is found to be insignificant as p = 0.312. The independent t-test results calculate 
the t-statistic as 1.026, and the significance or two tailed value of p is 0.612 (> 0.05). It can thus be 
concluded that the differences between the two groups are not statistically significant, and that the 
safety perceptions of senior and junior officers are similar. 
 
4.5 Analysis of Responses 
The summary of responses (Appendix) indicates that there are many areas where officers feel 
positively about the aspects of safety culture on board. A majority of officers (86%) felt they were 
actively encouraged to improve shipboard safety, with high priority placed on safety training (78%) 
and the availability of essential personal protective equipment (PPE). Most considered their co-
workers safety conscious (69%), felt free to ask for guidance (88%) and to report unsafe acts or 
incidents (75%), while 61% found the safety training provided to be useful. On safety management, 
again a majority (70%) agreed that they were not encouraged to break procedures to achieve targets, 
although this number drops to 56% on whether safety was compromised to meet schedules. On 
board ship, 56% found the shipboard management genuinely caring about safety and wellbeing, and 
45% reported satisfaction with their performance feedback.  
On the organizational front, just about half (52%) considered the company to be sincerely 
concerned about wellbeing, health and safety, while 43% did not feel they were considered an 
important part of the organization.  Nearly a third felt that the organization compromised on quality 
at the cost of safety, and did not have necessary resources to do the job well. On work and rest 
issues, 42% did not find their workload excessive, a similar percentage stated that they got adequate 
rest, 40% agreed to taking short cuts on safety to complete jobs faster, while only 18% attested to 
the existence of a ‘no blame’ culture prevailing. 
 
 
V. Discussion 
The mean Safety Score was calculated as 65.85, with 13.4% officers who perceive high safety 
standards on board ships, while a similar number (14.3%) had a low safety perception. The majority 
(72.3%) falls into the “Medium” category and do not perceive safety standards or the safety culture 
to be high. This would indicate that the espoused values of safety culture are not trickling down to 
team members on board. 
Factor analysis identified seven factors responsible for 64.810% of the variability. The strongest 
driver predictive of safety was Support on Safety, that is, the support provided by employers in 
safety matters. This factor includes elements such as the concern for safety demonstrated by 
shipboard management, compliance with SMS’s, safety training, and participation in safety issues. 
On most of these elements, the responses are favourable with the majority agreeing that 
participation in safety issues is encouraged, while high priority is given to safety training and 
adherence to laid down procedures. On the safety – schedules relationship, even though more than 
half (56.4%) agreed that there was no pressure; nearly half the officers may feel pressure in some 
form or the other. Again just more than half (56%) had a positive impression of shipboard 
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management’s genuine interest in safety and wellbeing, something that could be attributed to the 
short tenures on board and a lack of permeation of organizational culture to the ships senior staff.  
The second driver is organizational support which represents the mutual trust that exists between 
employer and employee, the feeling of worth felt by the seafarer evidenced by the resources spent 
on training, and providing feedback and guidance. Just about half the respondents (51%) felt that 
their employers showed a genuine interest in their safety and wellbeing, and these numbers must 
increase to demonstrate mutual trust. This is not helped by only 42% feeling a valuable part of the 
organization. The organizations interest can be seen through the usefulness of training provided 
where 60% agreed to its usefulness, but this was qualified by 45% who did not get proper feedback 
and guidance on their performance. Organizations need to demonstrate more interest by ensuring 
proper evaluations and providing necessary training accordingly, instead of unilateral training 
programs. Training and performance review go hand in hand as there is an intrinsic relationship 
between training, competence and procedures; training someone to do something does not mean 
they are automatically competent (IMO, 2003). Very often procedures are mistakenly viewed as a 
way of bridging the gap between training and competence; however, procedures can never replace 
the understanding and awareness that are innate to competence.   
The third factor identified is the availability of adequate resources to do any task well. Resources 
refer to both work and safety related materials, as well as the quality of these resources. IMO (2003) 
states that “the success of any safety culture will be dependent upon the resources made available 
to support, nurture and develop it. Safety has to be seen at the centre of all decision making and not 
just as an aside that needs considering once all other decisions are made”. The majority (79%) have 
the necessary safety resources in terms of PPE, but this drops to 47% who are satisfied with work 
resources, be it spares/stores or manpower. Unfortunately, only 28% find that quality is not 
compromised over safety, which may reflect on the quality of resources provided. It has been 
recognized that improved safety has brought improved productivity leading to greater profitability; 
this relationship is now so widely recognized that the economic arguments for not promoting safety 
management i.e., it will cost too much, cannot be justified (IMO, 2003).  
The fourth factor refers to the workplace environment on board in terms of on the job guidance, 
safety conscious co-workers and the encouragement received to report near misses and incidents. 
A stable work force is essential to an effective safety culture as workers are familiar with safety 
practices, with each other and in turn feel confident in asking for assistance wherever required. On 
this factor, the majority of officers responded positively indicating that at least on board ship, the 
ships’ crew manages safety well. 
The fifth factor relates to job demands in the form of workloads and the availability of adequate 
and quality rest periods. On work being excessive, 41% disagreed, while on rest periods, 42% were 
satisfied with the availability of adequate rest.  Work and rest impact safety as the crew should be 
responsive to the demands of the job, including unexpected events and emergencies; they should 
get adequate rest between shifts to maximize their alertness and readiness to respond during their 
work periods (ABS, 2012). The issues of reduced manning, increased workload and resulting 
fatigue have continued to play a major role in many maritime accidents to the present day. The 
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Cardiff surveys (Smith et al., 2006) have also shown that fatigue is a major problem and that about 
30% of seafarers report that they are very fatigued, about 25% reported fatigue while on watch, and 
many reported that they had fallen asleep while on watch (Smith, n.d.). 
The existing culture on blame forms the sixth factor and indicates the perceptions of seafarers 
regarding the existence of a no-blame culture on board. Organizational learning is an essential part 
of safety culture effectiveness, and refers to the ability of all affected by safety to learn from past 
mistakes and improve themselves and the systems that support their activities. This state can only 
be fully reached when there is a ‘No Blame Culture’ (IMO, 2003). There appears to be a huge gap 
here as only 18% agreed that their employers followed a no-blame culture, while 53.6% disagreed.  
The last factor – safety compliance - represents the success of the safety culture in that seafarers 
are still forced by circumstances to take short cuts on safety matters to complete jobs within 
schedules. Even though three quarters (75%) of respondents disclosed that they report all unsafe 
acts and conditions without hesitation, one third (33.2%) stated they had taken short cuts in safety 
matters. This could partly be due to selective reporting in the absence of a ‘no blame’ culture, 
pressure to adhere to schedules, or simple fatigue due inadequate rest. 
 
5.1 Safety Perceptions 
5.1.1 Ship Owners vs. Ship Managers 
It has been stated that the popularity of ship management companies could be a deterrent in 
achieving an effective safety culture, and it can be argued that Shipowners being larger stakeholders 
have more to gain from an effective safety culture. The results of the comparison of safety 
perceptions between officers employed by each do not show any statistically significant differences 
between the two groups of officers. However, on an individual element basis, there were some 
differences as can be seen in the Appendix. Owners employing officers had a better record on 
elements such as encouragement to improve safety, putting schedules above safety, safety conscious 
crew, and the availability of adequate rest. Surprisingly, managers scored better on their emphasis 
on safety training. Generally speaking, however, the pattern of responses from both groups were 
similar with no significant differences, leading to the conclusion that safety climate can be 
considered independent of the type of employer. 
 
5.1.1 Ship Owners vs. Ship Managers 
The safety culture, as well as the organizational culture, of the shipping company is 
implemented on board through the senior officers, in particular by the Master, who acts as the 
Owners representative. The senior shipboard management’s attitudes on safety have a deep impact 
on the way safety is managed on ships as it reflects the safety values the company stands for and 
the emphasis it places on safe operations. If the senior management does not have positive 
perceptions of the safety values espoused by the employers, it may result in dilution of the safety 
culture, leading to unsafe operating environments on board. The results indicate that the safety 
perceptions of both Senior and Junior Officers were not different, reinforced by the similarities 
between the categories of safety scores. 
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VI. Conclusions and Practical Implications 
The study provides insights into the safety environment on board and whether it is driven by a 
genuine belief in safety and wellbeing or is in fact a means of acquiring regulatory acceptance. It 
captures the safety climate on board which through the misalignments measured can be seen as 
different from the effective safety culture envisaged by the IMO and the ISM Code. 
The study also found many misalignments between safety culture and the safety climate. As it 
is there are many barriers to an effective safety culture as discussed earlier; additionally shipping 
companies must address the negative perceptions of seafarers in order to bring about alignment. 
Foremost among these is the lack of a ‘no blame culture’. The presence of a culture which places 
blame on an individual following an accident or near miss has clear implications for the other 
indicators of a positive safety culture; it inhibits reporting, prevents the thorough examination of 
incidents, prevents learning, and has a negative effect on staff motivation (HSC, 2001). Employees 
have confidence that a just system exists where honest errors can be reported without fear of 
reprisals (ABS, 2012). If ship owners are genuinely interested in an effective safety culture, it is 
imperative that they ensure and demonstrate a visible blame free atmosphere which allows reporting 
of honest errors and consequent learning. In the absence of this, there can never be an effective 
safety culture and safety will amount to little more than a paperwork exercise. 
IMO (2003) states that a good relationship between employer and employee results in 
employees being more proactive in both understanding and adopting any proposed safety measures; 
negative perceptions will result in employees mistrusting the motives of the employer. Job 
satisfaction and the feeling of worth are additional areas of improvement with nearly half the 
respondents not feeling part of the organization. Seafarers must be seen as integral to the system 
and not as a cost. Ship owners would be better served if their commitment was visibly demonstrated 
through their actions. 
On the issue of resources, a shortage of work materials and equipment on one hand and 
sufficient manpower on the other are barriers. Lack of materials leads to shortcuts and eventually 
impacts workplace safety. The other major and unaddressed issue is that of excessive workload and 
availability of quality rest. Excessive workload compounded by inadequate rest gives rise to fatigue 
and burnout whereby mental and physical energy is depleted and manifests itself in negative 
employee well-being, which includes worker anxiety, health, and depression, and work-related 
stress (Nahrgang, 2010).  
The productivity – safety relationship also appears skewed with costs playing a major role in 
decision making. As suggested by IMO (2003) “quality shipowners know that attention to quality 
and safety pays unseen dividends as accidents do cost money. This again supports the need for 
greater accountability and transparency so that those that benefit from the risk-taking pay reasonable 
costs for mitigating those risks”. Financial constraints are always present, especially in depressed 
markets of today, but compromising on quality can result in more losses and a practicable balance 
has to be maintained. 
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There is also a word of caution for shipowners who directly employ their crew. Ship owning 
companies are generally preferred by seafarers due to the belief that being larger stakeholders, they 
will be more committed to their crew. The results do not prove this and ship owners should not be 
lulled into a false sense of security. Ship managers, with all their alleged faults, appear to be just as 
effective in dealing with shipboard safety. 
The pattern of responses shows a picture where a positive attitude is reported for sub factors 
that are within the ship and its control, such as, encouragement in participation, safety training, ease 
in reporting near misses, asking for guidance and safe co-workers. The dissatisfaction is apparent 
where support is expected from shore offices on issues such as organizational support, productivity-
safety relationship, resources and manpower, and organizational learning through a no-blame 
culture. This also indicates the misalignment in that the ships staff is doing its best to effectively 
manage safety on board, without adequate support from shore.  
In conclusion, despite the implementation of the ISM Code, there appears to be a significant 
gap between espoused safety values and those actually found on board - a gap that needs to be filled 
in order to have an effective safety culture. 
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 Appendix - Analysis of Response 
 
Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree
1 Encouraged to improve safety 2.1 11.3 86.6 2.6 8.9 88.5 4.6 16.8 78.6
2 High priority on safety training 4.9 16.9 78.2 5.2 16.8 78 1.7 13.4 84.8
3 Schedules never  above safety 14.3 29.3 56.4 14.1 23.6 62.3 13.9 34 52.1
4 Breaking rules to achieve targets 9.3 21.5 70.2 8.9 20.9 70.1 8 21.8 70.1
5 Ship’s management cares about safety and well being 13.6 30.3 56.1 11.1 29.3 58.7 14.7 30.7 54.6
6 Regular feedback and guidance on performance 18.7 36.5 44.8 18.3 34.6 47.1 18.4 37.8 43.7
7 Considered an important part of the company 15 42.7 42.3 12 45 43 17.2 41.2 41.6
8 Training given by the Company very useful 10 29.3 60.7 11 32.5 56.5 9.2 26.5 59.2
9 Company cares about wellbeing, health and safety 14.8 33.7 51.5 12.5 37.2 50.2 16.8 30.7 52.5
10 Spares/stores available 20.3 32.3 47.4 19.3 31.9 48.7 21.5 32.8 45.8
11 Availability of personal protective equipment (PPE) 4.2 17.1 78.7 2.6 16.8 80.6 5.5 17.2 77.3
12 Quality not compromised over costs 36.3 35.6 28.1 34 35.1 30.9 37.8 35.7 26.5
13 Freely report all unsafe acts or conditions 4.7 20.3 75 5.2 20.4 74.4 3.8 20.6 75.6
14 Comfortable asking for guidance 1.8 9.9 88.3 1.6 8.4 90 2.1 11.3 86.5
15 Safety conscious co-workers 4.6 26.6 68.8 2.1 22.5 75.4 6.3 29.8 63.9
16 Excessive work load 40.6 42.3 17.1 39.8 46.1 14.2 40.7 39.9 19.4
17 Adequate rest provided 28.4 29.8 41.8 22 28.8 49.2 32.7 30.7 36.6
18 Existence of ‘no blame’ culture 53.6 28.4 18 46.6 34 19.4 58.4 24.4 17.2
19 Bypassing safety to finish jobs quickly 33.2 26.8 40 36.1 29.3 34.5 31.5 24.4 44.2
Item Statement
Overall Owners Managers
